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Abstract
A well-known result by Vega-Redondo implies that in symmetric
Cournot oligopoly, imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome where
price equals marginal cost. In this paper we show that this result
is not robust to the slightest asymmetry in xed costs. Instead of
obtaining the Walrasian outcome as unique prediction, every outcome
where agents choose identical actions will be played some fraction of
the time in the long run. We then conduct experiments to check this
fragility. We obtain that, contrary to the theoretical prediction, the
Walrasian outcome is still a good predictor of behavior.
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1 Introduction
In a seminal paper Vega-Redondo (1997) shows how imitation of successful
behavior can push agents towards very competitive outcomes. Specically,
he shows that in Cournot games imitation of the most successful strate-
gies leads in the long run to the Walrasian outcome where price is equal
to marginal cost. This result is important since Cournot games not only
serve as the main workhorse model for industrial organization but reect,
more generally, environments where there is a tension between cooperation
and competition, with the Cournot-Nash equilibrium outcome somewhere
in between perfect collusion and perfect competition.1
Two experimental papers (Huck, Normann, and Oechssler, 1999 and Of-
ferman, Potters, and Sonnemans, 2002) conrm the behavioral relevance of
Vega-Redondos ndings. When experimental subjects have access to infor-
mation that allows them to imitate their rivals, competition gets signicantly
more intense. This is true even when subjects have all the necessary infor-
mation to play the Nash equilibrium. In fact, both papers show that while
subjects converge to Cournot-Nash if they have just the necessary informa-
tion to play a best reply, additional information about rivalschoices and
performance which orthodox game theory deems irrelevant leads them
away from equilibrium play towards more competitive outcomes.2
In this paper we re-examine both, Vega-Redondos theory and the ex-
perimental ndings on it. First, we show that Vega-Redondos theoretical
result is surprisingly fragile. Slightest di¤erences in costs are shown to have
a huge impact on the long-run behavior of agents. Specically, we show
that for an arbitrarily small change in some agents xed costs, we can nd
an action set from which quantities are chosen3 such that every outcome
1See Alos-Ferrer and Ania (2005) for a generalization of the result to a broader class
of games.
2Since then this link between information, imitation and competition has been repli-
cated in a number of papers. See, for example, Abbink and Brandts (2007), Huck, Nor-
mann, and Oechssler (2000), or Selten and Apesteguia (2005). See also Apesteguia, Huck,
and Oechssler (2007) who analyse, both, theoretically and experimentally, the di¤erences
between Vega-Redondos (1997) model of imitation and Schlags (1998).
3More technically speaking, we can nd a grid that is ne enough. Almost all models
of imitation deal with nite action spaces.
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where agents choose identical actions will be played some fraction of the
time in the long run. The intuition for this is simple. If a rm with a slight
xed cost advantage moves to a slightly di¤erent quantity, it will, due to its
cost advantage, still be the most successful rm and will thus be copied by
others.
We also show that this theoretical result is not only a curiosity that
occurs in the limit. Rather we nd in a series of simulations that small
di¤erences in agentscosts have large e¤ects on their prots if they imitate
most of the time but experiment with a reasonable frequency. Specically,
we report that when one rm has a slight cost advantage, industry prots
rise by more than 35% for experimentation rates of 10% or 20%.
Second, we conduct new experiments to analyze whether such cost di¤er-
entials also change behavior of subjects in the laboratory. Our ndings are
very clear-cut. Despite implementing a non-trivial cost di¤erential, we nd
no change in outcomes. When subjects can observe their rivals, outcomes
are far more competitive than predicted by the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
regardless of whether there are di¤erences in costs or not. This conrms
the strong behavioral link between feedback about rivals (market trans-
parency) and competitive behavior.
2 Theoretical predictions
As in VegaRedondos (1997) model we consider a market for a homogeneous
good where a set of rms N = f1; :::; ng is competing á la Cournot. Each
rm i produces some quantity qi. The vector of quantities by rms other
than i is denoted by q i: In line with the prior literature, we assume for
technical reasons that rms choose their output from a common grid   =
f0; ; 2; :::; vg with  > 0 and  2 N. The total quantity Q = Pni=1 qi
produced by all rms determines the price on the market via a linear inverse
demand function p(Q) = maxfa   bQ; 0g. We assume that all rms face
constant marginal costs c with 0  c < a. In addition, we assume that rm
i may have to bear some xed cost (or bonus) fi. So rm is cost function
is given by ci(qi) = cqi+ fi. The xed costs may di¤er among rms. Prots
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of rm i are given by
i(qi; q i) = (p(Q)  c) qi   fi:
The (symmetric) Walrasian quantity qw is dened as the quantity at which
price equals marginal cost c when all rms produce the same quantity.
Within our setup we have
qw =
a  c
bn
:
We assume that qw 2  , i.e. the Walrasian quantity is contained in the
quantity grid.
After each period t = 1; 2; ::: each rm observes the quantities produced
and the prots associated with these quantities of all rms in the market.
It then chooses the quantity that yielded the highest prot in the previous
period. That is, we are considering an imitate the best max rule.4 More
formally in period t rm i chooses
qti = q
t 1
j with j 2 arg max
m2N
t 1m (q
t 1
m ; q
t 1
 m):
Ties are assumed to be broken randomly. In addition, with small proba-
bility " > 0 each rm ignores the action prescribed by the imitation rule
and chooses an action at random from all actions in  . Let !q denote the
monomorphic state where all players set the same quantity q.
The adjustment process described above gives rise to a Markov process.
We use methods developed by Freidlin and Wentzel (1984) (rst applied
in an economic context by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob, 1993; Nöldeke and
Samuelson, 1993; and Young, 1993) to identify the set of stochastically stable
states, i.e. states that are in the support of the limit invariant distribution
as the mutation probability " goes to zero.
Let us now assume that some rm k has a cost advantage over all other
rms in the market. We model this cost advantage via the xed cost. In
particular and without loss of generality, we assume that fi = 0 for all i 6= k
and  fk = g  0.
4See Apesteguia et al. (2007) for a discussion of various imitation rules.
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Note that if g = 0, i.e. all rms have identical cost functions, a single
mutation towards the Walrasian quantity qw is always imitated by other
rms. The simple reason for this is that if the price exceeds marginal cost,
the rm with the highest quantity makes the largest prot and will be imi-
tated. If prices are below marginal costs, the rm with the lowest quantity
makes the largest prot and hence will be imitated. Hence, as shown by
VegaRedondo (1997), with identical cost functions only the state where all
rms set the Walrasian quantity is stochastically stable.
If however rm k has a cost advantage, it may be the case that after a
mutation of rm k away from the Walrasian quantity it still earns the highest
prot and hence will be imitated. Other rms, of course, do not realize that
this higher prot is due to the lower xed cost. They simply observe that the
strategy choice of rm k was more successful. This introduces another source
of bounded rationality which pushes the system away from the Walrasian
quantity.
Proposition 1 (1) If there are no di¤erences in xed cost (g = 0), then
the Walrasian state !qw is the unique stochastically stable state.
(2) For any di¤erence in xed costs g > 0; there exists a grid size 
such that for all  < , the set of stochastically stable states is given by the
set of all monomorphic states on the grid, f!qjq 2  g.
Proof. The rst part follows without modication from VegaRedondo
(1997).
With respect to the second part, note that as in VegaRedondos model,
under the imitate the best rule only monomorphic states are absorbing.
Consider any non-monomorphic state !. Assume that rms make di¤erent
prots and say rm j makes the highest prots. With positive probability
all rms will imitate rm j and we reach the state !qj . Note that there is
also the (nongeneric) case that rm k and rms i 6= k make the same prots
but o¤er di¤erent quantities. However, since ties are broken randomly, with
positive probability the dynamics will shift us to the state !qj .
We now identify the set of stochastically stable states for arbitrary g and
. Consider some monomorphic state !q and assume that rm k mutates
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and decreases its quantity by the smallest possible unit, i.e. rm k mutates
to qk  . This (downward) mutation will be followed if rm ks prots after
the mutation exceeds the prots of the other rms, i.e. if and only if
((a  b(nqk   ))  c)(qk   ) + g  ((a  b(nqk   )  c)qk:
So, a single downward mutation is followed if
q  qw + 
n
  g
bn
=: qlow: (1)
Note that this implies that the lowest quantity that can be reached by a
chain of single downward mutations is qlow   . Obviously, from all q > qw,
a downward move is always possible, just like in VegaRedondo (1997). But
for g > 0, downward moves become possible for some q < qw as well.
Likewise, note that a single upward mutation qk+  of rm k is followed
if
q  qw   
n
+
g
bn
=: qhigh: (2)
as long as p > 0. Again, we can move up to qhigh +  by a chain of single
mutations.
Consider now the case p = 0, i.e. q  abn . An upward mutation is followed
if  c(q + ) + g   cq: That is if
  g
c
: (3)
Note that if qhigh+  abn , inequality (3) holds also. That is, if we can move
up to the point where the price is zero, we can move up all the way to the
upper bound of our grid.
Figure 1 summarizes the results so far. All onestep mutations toward
qw are always possible. Downward movements for q < qw are possible if and
only if (1) is satised. Upwards movements for qw < q < abn are possible if
and only if (2) is satised. Upwards movements for q > abn are possible if
qw + (n 1)n +
g
bn  abn holds.
So all states in the following set can be reached from any other state by
a series of single mutations
B =

!qjq 2  ; qw   (n  1)
n
  g
bn
 q  q

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0 qw a / (bn) vd
always possible
always poss.
if (2) satisfied
if (1) satisfied
if d < g/c
Figure 1: Transitions from one monomorphic state to a neighboring one that
can be reached with one mutation.
where
q =
(
v if qw + (n 1)n +
g
bn  abn
qw + (n 1)n +
g
bn else
Hence, all states in B form one large mutation connected component,
which is stochastically stable (see Nöldeke and Samuelson, 1993). Note that
as  ! 0 the set B converges to the set f!qjq 2  g.
3 Experimental design
In our experiment, subjects played repeated 3player Cournot games in xed
groups for 60 periods. The payo¤ function for each round was given by
i(qi; q i) = p(Q)qi   fi;
with p(Q) = maxf120 Q; 0g being the inverse demand function. Marginal
cost were set to 0.
The grid of quantities was given by   = f20; 21; 21:5; :::; 39:5; 40g:5 Note
that the symmetric joint prot maximizing output is at qc = 20, the Cournot
Nash equilibrium output is at qN = 30, and the symmetric Walrasian output
is at qw = 40.
5Quantity 20.5 was excluded to have exactly 40 strategies.
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In order to make imitation salient and give the theoretical results the
best shot, subjects were not told anything about the games payo¤ function
apart from the fact that their payo¤deterministically depended on their own
choice and the choices of the two other subjects in their group, and that the
payo¤ function was the same throughout all of the experiment. After each
period, subjects learned their own payo¤, and the actions and payo¤s of
the two other subjects in their group. The 40 actions in   were labeled as
1; 2; :::; 40 in ascending order.
We ran two treatments, one symmetric and one asymmetric, that di¤ered
only on the value of the fis. In Treatment SYM, there were no xed costs,
fi = 0 for all i. In Treatment ASYM, however, there is a xed bonus for
rm 3, g =  f3 = 50; while fi = 0 for i = 1; 2: This amounts to the same as
having xed cost of 50 for rms 1 and 2 but has the advantage of avoiding
losses for subjects which are di¢ cult to enforce in an experiment. Subjects
are not informed about di¤erences in xed cost in ASYM although they may
notice them when all subjects in a group choose the same or similar actions
but realize di¤erent payo¤s.
The computerized experiments6 were run in the ELSE laboratory at
UCL. We had 7 independent groups in SYM and 8 in ASYM. In total 45
subjects participated in the experiment, drawn from the student population
at UCL.7 Subjects were paid a showup fee of £ 5 and in addition to this were
given £ 0.005 per point won during the experiment. The average payment
was around £ 11 per subject, including the show-up fee. All sessions lasted
less than 60 minutes.
Given this setup we can derive the following theoretical hypothesis from
Proposition 1.
Hypothesis Q In treatment SYM, the Walrasian quantity qw is the unique
stochastically stable state according to the imitate the best max rule.
However, in treatment ASYM, all monomorphic states f!qjq 2  g
are in the support of the limit invariant distribution and should be
6The program was written with ztree of Fischbacher (2007).
7We recruited 8 groups for both treatments but due to noshows, only 7 groups were
complete in SYM.
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observed with strictly positive probability in the long run.
To obtain quantitative predictions about prots in the short and medium
run, we have conducted computer simulations that allow for realistic noise
levels. The program followed with probability 1   " the imitation rule and
chose actions with a uniform distribution from   with probability ". In
10,000 repetitions of 60 periods, prots were 35.2% higher on average in
ASYM than in SYM for " = 0:2 and 37.8% higher for " = 0:1.8
Hypothesis P Prots in treatment ASYM should be higher than in treat-
ment SYM.
4 Experimental results
Figure 2 shows relative frequencies of actions separately for our two treat-
ments. There is clearly no signicant di¤erence between the two distribu-
tions according to a KolmogorovSmirnov test at any conventional signi-
cance level. The mode of both distributions is at 40, the Walrasian quantity,
which is predicted by theory for SYM but not necessarily for ASYM.
Table 1 shows average quantities and the percentage deviation of average
prots from the Cournot equilibrium prots for the two treatments over all
periods.9 Prots for treatment ASYM are calculated excluding the bonus
of 50 for rm 3.
Table 1: Summary statistics
% deviation from
Average quantities Cournot equilibrium prots
Treatment
SYM 34:1  39:8
ASYM 34:7  42:2
Note: Prots in ASYM do not include g:
8Prots in ASYM are calculated excluding the bonus of 50 for rm 3.
9There is no noticable time trend in the data.
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Figure 2: Histograms of individual quantities by treatment.
We nd no signicant di¤erence between average quantities according
to MWU tests (see, e.g., Siegel and Castellan 1988) on the basis of average
quantities per group. Likewise, there is no signicant di¤erence with respect
to the deviation from Cournot prots. However, for both treatments we
observe a sizable deviation from Cournot prots towards the zeroprot
predictions of the competitive equilibrium. This seems remarkable given
the understandable resistance of subjects to remain near this zeroprot
area.
We summarize our results as follows.
Result (1) Contrary to the theoretical prediction, there is no signicant
di¤erence between our SYM and ASYM treatments in terms of quan-
tities. In fact, in both treatments the mode of quantities is at the
competitive quantity of 40.
(2) In both treatments there is a substantial deviation of prots of
around  40% from the Cournot equilibrium prot. We nd no sup-
port for Hypothesis P, which predicts higher prots in ASYM.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we study the fragility and robustness of the prediction in Vega-
Redondos imitation theory. If agents can observe their rivals and imitate the
action that in the previous round was most successful, Walrasian outcomes
emerge in the long run. However, as we show, this does no longer hold
if there are di¤erences in costs, even if these di¤erences are very small.
Intuitively, one would think that such a fragility would severely limit the
theorys predictive power. But intuition is wrong. Despite its theoretical
fragility, the link between information about rivals and intense competition
is robust. Di¤erences in costs do not help subjects to overcome cut-throat
competition. This stresses the behavioral importance of information about
rivals that orthodox game theory deems irrelevant.
References
[1] Abbink, K., and Brandts, J. (2007), 24, Games and Economic Be-
havior, forthcoming.
[2] Alos-Ferrer, C. and Ania, A. (2005), The Evolutionary Stability of
Perfectly Competitive Behavior, Economic Theory, 26, 497516.
[3] Apesteguia, J., Huck, S. and Oechssler, J. (2007), Imitation: Theory
and Experimental Evidence, Journal of Economic Theory, 136, 217-
235.
[4] Fischbacher, U. (2007), zTree: Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Eco-
nomic Experiments, Experimental Economics, 10, 171-178.
[5] Huck, S., Normann, H.T., and Oechssler, J. (1999), Learning in
Cournot Oligopoly: An Experiment, Economic Journal, 109, C80-
C95.
[6] Huck, S., Normann, H.T., and Oechssler, J. (2000), Does Informa-
tion about CompetitorsActions Increase or Decrease Competition in
10
Experimental Oligopoly Markets?, International Journal of Industrial
Organization, 18, 39-57.
[7] Kandori, M., Mailath, G. and Rob, R. (1993), Learning, Mutation,
and Long Run Equilibria in Games, Econometrica, 61, 29-56.
[8] O¤erman, T., Potters, J., and Sonnemans, J. (2002), Imitation and
Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment, Review of Economic Stud-
ies, 69, 973-997.
[9] Schlag, K. (1998), Why Imitate, and If So, How? A Boundedly Ratio-
nal Approach to Multi-armed Bandits, Journal of Economic Theory
78, 130-56.
[10] Selten, R., and Apesteguia, J. (2005), Experimentally Observed Im-
itation and Cooperation in Price Competition on the Circle, Games
and Economic Behavior, 51, 171-192.
[11] Siegel, S. and N. Castellan, J. Jr. (1988), Nonparametric Statistics for
the Behavioral Sciences, Singapore: McGraw-Hill.
[12] VegaRedondo, F. (1997), The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior,
Econometrica, 65, 375-384.
[13] Young, H.P. (1993), The Evolution of Conventions, Econometrica,
61, 57-84.
Appendix: Instructions
Welcome to our experiment! Please read these instructions carefully. Do
not talk with others and remain quiet during the entire experiment. If you
have any questions, please ask us. We will come to you and answer your
question privately.
During this experiment, which lasts for 60 rounds, you will be able to
earn points in every round. You will form a group with two other partic-
ipants. The composition of your group remains constant throughout the
course of the experiment. The number of points you may earn depends on
11
your action and the actions of the two other participants in your group.
At the end of the experiment your accumulated points will be converted to
pound sterling at a rate of 200 : 1.
Each round, you will have to choose one of 40 di¤erent actions, actions
1; 2; 3; : : : ; 40. Actions are ordered such that action 1 is the smallest and
action 40 is the largest action. We are not going to tell you how your payo¤
is calculated, but in every round your payo¤ depends uniquely on your own
decision and the decisions of the two other participants in your group. The
rule underlying the calculation of the payo¤ does not depend on chance and
remains the same in all 60 rounds.
After every round you get to know how many points you earned with
your action in the current round. In addition, you will receive information
about the actions of the other two participants in your group, and how many
points each of them earned.
After the last period you will be reminded of all your 60 payo¤s and the
computer will calculate the sum of these which will then be converted into
pound sterling.
These are all the rules. Should you have any questions, please ask now.
Otherwise have fun in the next 60 rounds.
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